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ANEKĀNTAVĀDA, THE CENTRAL PHILOSOPHY OF ĀJĪVIKISM? 
 
Johannes Bronkhorst 
 
 B. K. Matilal, already in the title of his book that came out in 1981, called anekāntavāda the 
central philosophy of Jainism. Others, most notably (and perhaps most recently) Jayandra 
Soni (2007: 5), have protested, describing anekāntavāda as “a small, albeit basic, part of Jain 
thought”.1 
 Anekāntavāda is “the theory of the many-sided nature of reality”. Matilal (1981: 26 
ff.) has drawn attention to the fact that anekāntavāda was, or came to be, a solution to what 
he calls the “paradox of causality”.2 Matilal maintained that Mahāvīra himself played a 
crucial role in the formulation of the anekāntavāda.3 Whatever the truth in this matter, the 
paradox of causality came to occupy the mind of Indian thinkers long after him, so that the 
anekāntavāda as solution to this paradox is much more recent than Mahāvīra, too.4 We will 
return to this question below. 
                                                          
1 Soni 2007: 5 further sounds a note of warning: “One is led to ignore the fact that Jain philosophy has made 
other contributions apart from the syād- and naya-vāda aspects of anekāntavāda, e.g., insightful deliberations 
concerning dravya, guṇa and paryāya (substance, quality and mode).” According to Flügel 2012: 164, 
anekāntavāda “is nowadays seen as a trademark of Jaina philosophy”. 
 
2 At a later time, the anekāntavāda came to be used to classify non-Jaina systems of thought; see Bronkhorst, 
forthcoming a. 
 
3 There is some ambiguity in Matilal’s (1981) remarks on this matter. On the one hand, he accepts “the 
hypothesis that the beginnings of the anekānta doctrine are to be traced in the teachings of Mahāvīra the Jina”, 
and states that “what was known as the vibhajya-vāda in the later part of the śramaṇa movement in India 
culminated in the anekānta-vāda of Mahāvīra” (p. 3). Less clear are: “[T]his second sub-variety of the vibhajya 
method was adopted chiefly by Mahāvīra the Jina. And thus, this was developed into the anekānta method” (p. 
11): “the vibhajya method in the hands of Mahāvīra was transformed into the anekānta philosophy of the 
Jainas” (p. 22), and “Mahāvīra thus developed a philosophy of synthesis and toleration, which later came to be 
designated as the anekānta-vāda” (p. 23). Note that Pāsādika (2012), following Matilal, argues for a forerunner 
of the anekāntavāda in the Buddhist canon. 
 
4 Bronkhorst 2003; 2011: 70-79. Scholars have looked for precursors of anekāntavāda both inside and outside 
Jaina literature. For an overview, see Matilal 1981: 1-16. 
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 Recall what the paradox of causality is all about.5 The problem with which it is 
confronted can be illustrated with a simple example. How can a pot, or anything else for that 
matter, be produced? If there is no pot as yet, what is produced? And if the pot is already 
there, it need no longer be produced. I have argued elsewhere6 that the problem is the result 
of the acceptance of the “correspondence principle”: people implicitly believed that the words 
in a statement correspond to entities in the situation depicted by that statement. In other 
words, there had to be a pot in the situation depicted by the statement “the potter makes a 
pot”. This implicit belief — it is but rarely given an explicit formulation — inevitably led to 
the “paradox of causality”, which all Indian philosophers from the early centuries CE had to 
face, and which they all proposed to solve, be it in different ways. 
 A good illustration of how the Jainas dealt with the paradox of causality is provided 
by the following passage from Jinabhadra's Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya:7 
 
“In this world there are things that are being produced having been produced 
already, others [are being produced] not having been produced already, others 
[are being produced] having been produced and not having been produced, 
others again [are being produced] while being produced, and some are not 
being produced at all, according to what one wishes to express. ... For example, 
a pot is being produced having been produced in the form of clay etc., because 
it is made of that. That same [pot] is being produced not having been produced 
concerning its particular shape, because that was not there before. ...” 
 
Confronted with the question how a pot can be produced, given that there is no pot at that 
moment, Jinabhadra would answer that there is already a pot at that time, at least in one 
sense, in the form of clay. In another sense it is not yet there, because its particular shape is 
not yet there. In this way the “paradox of causality” disappears (or is believed to disappear) 
like snow in the sun. 
 I have argued elsewhere (Bronkhorst, 2003: 105-106) that this particular solution 
appears for the first time in the story of the heretic Jamāli in the Viyāhapannatti. As a matter 
                                                          
5 The following lines also occur in Bronkhorst, forthcoming a. 
 
6 Bronkhorst 2011. 
 
7 Jinabhadra, Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, Part II, p. 385 (under verses 2183-84): iha kiñcit jātaṃ jāyate, kiñcid 
ajātam, kiñcij jātājātam, kiñcij jāyamānam, kiñcit sarvathā na jāyate, vivakṣātaḥ. ... yatheha ghaṭo 
mṛdrūpādibhir jāta eva jāyate, tanmayatvāt. sa evākāraviśeṣeṇājāto jāyate, prāgabhāvāt. rūpādibhir 
ākāraviśeṣeṇa ca [jātā]jāto jāyate, tebhyo 'narthāntaratvāt. atītānāgatakālayor vinaṣṭānutpannatvāt 
kriyānupapattir vartamānamātrasamaya eva kriyāsadbhāvāj jāyamāno jāyate. 
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of fact, the story of Jamāli brought together two kinds of statements that had been separately 
attributed to Mahāvīra by earlier tradition. The specific combination we find here, along with 
Jamāli's literal interpretation of one of these statements, provided a solution to the problem of 
production (or causality) that had come to occupy the minds of virtually all Indian thinkers. 
The statement to the effect that what is being made has been made was here, perhaps for the 
first time, taken literally, and provided a solution to the problem of production. However, the 
undesired consequence that this way a completely static picture of the world would arise, in 
which nothing would ever change, could be avoided by recalling Mahāvīra's habit to 
approach questions from various sides. 
 Let us now leave Jainism on one side, and turn to a remark about the Ājīvikas that 
occurs in a Sāṃkhya text, the Māṭharavṛtti on Sāṃkhyakārikā 9. The Sāṃkhyakārikā 
introduces here the doctrine known as satkāryavāda, according to which the effect (kārya) 
exists (sat) already in its cause before it is produced. In concrete terms, if the effect to be 
produced is a pot, this doctrine states that the pot is already present in the clay out of which it 
will be made. It will be clear that the satkāryavāda is the Sāṃkhya solution to the “paradox 
of causality”. 
 The Māṭharavṛtti introduces this verse as follows (p. 16): 
 
tiṣṭhatu tāvad etat. anyat pṛcchāmaḥ: kim etad mahadādi prāg utpatteḥ 
pradhāne saj jāyata utāsat sambhavati. atrācāryāṇāṃ vipratipattir ataḥ 
saṃśayaḥ. atra vaiśeṣikā vipratipannā asataḥ sad bhavatīti manyante. 
mṛtpiṇḍe hi prāg utpatter ghaṭo nāstīti vyavasitās te. asti nāstīti varākā 
ājīvikāḥ. naivāsti na ca nāsti. eṣa bauddhānāṃ pakṣaḥ. evam 
anyonyavirodhavādiṣu darśiṣu ko nāma niścayaḥ. 
 
The passage is here quoted as given by Isabelle Ratié (forthcoming), and deviates from the 
printed edition in one respect: instead of jīvakāḥ it has ājīvikāḥ, a conjectural emendation 
proposed to Ratié by Vincent Eltschinger and Alexis Sanderson. 
 Ratié translates the passage as follows: 
 
“Let us admit what [has been said] so far. [But] we [now] ask something else: 
do [the evolutes that are] the Great, etc., arise [while they already] exist in 
matter before [their] arisal, or are they nonexistent [at that time]? In this 
respect, there is a disagreement (vipratipatti) among masters, therefore there is 
a doubt. [Thus] the Vaiśeṣikas, who are of a wrong opinion (vipratipanna) in 
this respect, consider that that which exists comes from that which does not 
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exist. For they consider that in the lump of clay, before the arisal [of the pot], 
there is no pot. The wretched Ājīvikas [consider] that [the effect] is [both] 
existing and nonexistent. And the thesis of the Buddhists is that [the effect] is 
neither existing nor nonexistent. Thus, since those teachers hold theses 
contradicting each other, what certainty [could we get]?” 
 
We are here primarily concerned with the sentence: “The wretched Ājīvikas [consider] that 
[the effect] is [both] existing and nonexistent.” 
 It is not difficult to understand the use of this particular position. We find ourselves, 
once again, in the midst of a discussion about the paradox of causality. How is it possible to 
make something that is not there? What does one make when one makes a pot, given that 
there is no pot at that time? The followers of the satkāryavāda maintained that, in spite of 
appearances, the pot is there, other thinkers opted for other solutions. The Ājīvikas, according 
to this passage from the Māṭharavṛtti, stated that the pot is both there and not there. The 
advantage of their position would clearly be that they had an answer to the following, 
potentially embarrassing question: If the pot is already there at the time you are making it, 
why do you bother to make it? 
 But this is also the solution offered in Jinabhadra's Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya, as we have 
seen. What is more, this is in essence the position known as anekāntavāda. In other words, 
the Sāṃkhya commentator Māṭhara ascribes to the Ājīvikas the position that we know came 
to be held by Jainas. How is this possible? 
 Two possibilities come to mind. One is that Māṭhara uses the expression Ājīvikas8 to 
refer to Jainas. We know that the former term was sometimes used in the early Buddhist 
canon to refer to the followers of Mahāvīra,9 but this was many centuries before Māṭhara.10 It 
seems unrealistic to assume, without proof, that this custom had survived until Māṭhara’s 
time. 
 Alternatively, Māṭhara knew Ājīvikas, and these Ājīvikas had adopted the same 
response to the “paradox of causality” as the Jainas. This, if true, almost forces us to consider 
that the Ājīvikas had taken this response from the Jainas (or, perhaps, that the Jainas had 
taken it from the Ājīvikas). This in its turn is only conceivable if we assume that Ājīvikas and 
                                                          
8 Or rather Jīvaka; see below. 
 
9 Bronkhorst, 2000. 
 
10 Jain 1984: 311 claims that Śīlāṅka, in the ninth century CE, identifies Ājīvikas with Digambaras in his 
commentary on the Sūyagaḍa, but Basham 1951: 174 ff. shows that this is not the case. 
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Jainas had remained in close contact right until the time when the paradox of causality began 
to occupy the minds of Indian thinkers. We have some reason to suppose that Ājīvikas and 
Jainas still knew each other in Kuṣāṇa times,11 but we are in the dark as far as more recent 
times are concerned.12 
 When did Māṭhara live? Frauwallner (1953: 478 n. 149) observed long ago: “Über die 
Zeit der Kommentare zur Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, vor allem der Māṭharavṛttiḥ und des 
Gauḍapādabhāṣyam ist mehr geschrieben worden, als ihrem inhaltlichen Wert entspricht.” 
That may be so, but for our specific enquiry the date of the Māṭharavṛtti is very important. 
Larson and Bhattacharya (1987: 291) sum up research as follows:13 
 
“[O]ur extant Māṭharavṛtti has a common core of content with four other early 
commentaries on the Sāṃkhyakārikā. Although for many years it was thought 
that the Māṭharavṛtti may have been the original upon which the other four 
were based, there is now a general consensus that our extant Māṭharavṛtti is the 
latest of the five commentaries and may be dated anywhere from the ninth 
century onward. The commentary contains quotations from the Purāṇas, 
appears to presuppose a much more sophisticated logic (based most likely on 
later Nyāya discussions), and presents overall a fuller and more systematic 
treatment of Sāṃkhya (strongly suggesting that it is a later expansion of the 
earlier and briefer discussions in the other related commentaries). E. A. 
Solomon has suggested that our extant Māṭharavṛtti closely follows her 
recently edited Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti, and that the former may be an expanded 
version of the latter (with some borrowing also from the other three). She also 
suggests that Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti may have been an original Māṭharabhāṣya 
by the ancient Sāṃkhya teacher Māṭhara, mentioned in the Anuyogadvārasūtra 
of the Jains, and that our extant Māṭharavṛtti may be the same as the 
commentary referred to by Guṇaratnasūri in his commentary (from the 
fifteenth century) on the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya by the expression 
māṭharaprānta (the Māṭhara ‘corner’ or school).” 
 
                                                          
11 Bronkhorst, forthcoming. 
 
12 See, however, Bronkhorst, 2012: 827f. and Qvarnström, forthcoming. 
 
13 See also Larson & Bhattacharya 1987: 167-9 for a more detailed presentation of the scholarly literature, with 
detailed references. See further Hulin 1978: 139. 
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If the above estimates are correct, we are led to conclude that a Sāṃkhya commentator from 
the ninth century or later was acquainted with Ājīvikas, and knew that these Ājīvikas adhered 
to the anekāntavāda in some form or other. 
 All this is highly surprising, to say the least, and we are entitled to wonder whether we 
are not drawing far-reaching conclusions from shaky evidence. Our first question therefore 
has to be: Was the emendation from jīvaka to ājīvika (or ājīvaka) in Māṭhara’s text justified? 
As a matter of fact, none of the other surviving commentaries on Sāṃkhyakārikā 9 refer to 
the Ājīvikas. Ratié (forthcoming) summarizes their observations like this: 
 
“[T]hese commentaries vary greatly as regards the number of theses involved 
in the debate and the authorship of these theses: thus the Gauḍapādabhāṣya 
merely opposes the Sāṃkhya contention that the effect exists before the 
operation of its cause to that of the ‘Buddhists, etc.’ who consider the effect as 
nonexistent, whereas the Māṭharavṛtti explains that according to the 
Vaiśeṣikas, the effect is nonexistent, and attributes to the Ājīvikas the thesis 
that the effect is both existing and nonexistent, and to the Buddhists, the thesis 
that it is neither; the Jayamaṅgalā mentions the theses that the effect exists, 
that it is nonexistent, and that it is both, and contents itself with attributing the 
second to the Vaiśeṣikas; the Yuktidīpikā mentions the thesis that prior to its 
arisal the effect is nonexistent (and ascribes it to the Vaiśeṣikas and 
Naiyāyikas), the thesis that the effect is both existing and nonexistent (and 
ascribes it to the Buddhists) and the thesis that it is neither (without any explicit 
attribution); the Tattvakaumudī mentions the thesis that the effect comes to 
exist from a nonexistent cause, the thesis (obviously, that of the Vedāntins) that 
the effect is only an illusory manifestation (vivarta) and therefore no existing 
entity, the thesis (ascribed to the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas) that the 
nonexistent effect arises from an existing cause, and the Sāṃkhya thesis.” 
 
Clearly, only the Māṭharavṛtti refers to the Ājīvikas, if we accept the emendation proposed. 
But is this emendation justified? 
 This question leads us to an interesting and perhaps important observation. The non-
emended form Jīvaka exists as a synonym of Ājīvika, but, judging by Basham’s (1951: 182-
4) book, only the lexicographer Halāyudha and the astrologer Vaidyanātha Dīkṣita are known 
to have used it. That is to say, even without emendation the passage from the Māṭharavṛtti 
refers to Ājīvikas, but by using jīvaka rather than ājīvika it may tell us something about 
Māṭhara’s time and place. 
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 Consider the following passage in A. L. Basham’s (1951: 182) History and Doctrines 
of the Ājīvikas: 
 
“Halāyudha gives two lists of unorthodox ascetics in separate verses, the first 
of which … contains clothed heretical ascetics, and the second members of the 
naked category:— 
nagnāṭo digvāsāḥ kṣapaṇaḥ śramaṇaś ca jīvako jainaḥ 
ājīvo maladhārī nirgranthaḥ kathyate sadbhiḥ 
‘By the educated a naked wanderer is called digvāsāḥ, etc.’” 
 
What do we know about Halāyudha? If the lexicographer of that name is also the Halāyudha 
who composed the Kavirahasya, which serves as a eulogy of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Kṛṣṇa III, 
he must have lived in the former half of the tenth century in southern India.14 Basham (1951: 
182) concludes from this that he “had no doubt come into contact with the Tamil Ājīvikas”. 
We have already seen that Māṭhara “may be dated anywhere from the ninth century onward”. 
Like Halāyudha, he may have come into contact with the Tamil Ājīvikas. If so, he may have 
become acquainted with their position as to the “paradox of causality”. 
 Vaidyanātha the author of the Jātakapārijāta, the work in which he mentions the 
Jīvaka (15.15-16), wrote in South India before 1450 CE (Pingree, 1981: 91f.). 
 It may here be recalled that the tenth century Vaiśeṣika commentator Śrīdhara shows 
in his work acquaintance with Ājīvika thought (as did the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa 
before him).15 Śrīdhara, it appears, belonged to Bengal.16 
 
Conclusion 
 
The tentative conclusion we arrive at is that the Ājīvikas of southern India of the end of the 
first and/or beginning of the second millennium were known by the name Jīvakas, and shared 
with the Jainas the anekāntavāda, the view that reality is multiplex. Given that the two 
religions were originally close to each other17 and appear to have remained close for a number 
                                                          
14 Keith 1920: 133; Winternitz 1920: 72, 413; Vogel 1979: 321. 
 
15 Bronkhorst 2007. 
 
16 Potter 1977: 485. 
 
17 See Bronkhorst 2003a. 
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of centuries, we are led to conclude that they were still close when the anekāntavāda was 
applied to the paradox of causality. When was that? 
 We have already seen that some scholars attribute the anekāntavāda to Mahāvīra 
himself.18 Whatever the truth in this matter, it became the Jaina response to the paradox of 
causality, and this paradox did not yet occupy the minds of Indian thinkers until long after 
Mahāvīra. In this form the anekāntavāda was introduced into Jainism before the closure of 
the Śvetāmbara canon, as I have shown elsewhere. It is also already known to Kundakunda’s 
Pravacanasāra (2.22-23), as I have argued (Bronkhorst, forthcoming a). The position of the 
Tattvārthasūtra remains obscure. 
 It appears, then, that Ājīvikas and Jainas were still in close contact during the first half 
of the first millennium CE, so close that the Ājīvikas borrowed wholesale the solution to the 
paradox of causality that the Jainas elaborated at that time, or vice-versa. This relatively late 
example of Jaina influence on Ājīvikism or vice-versa would have remained unnoticed, had it 
not been for the fact that a Sāṃkhya commentator, Māṭhara, felt the need to mention the 
Ājīvikas in passing in his otherwise unremarkable commentary. 
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